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Recent Developments
FINES - Imprisonment Of Indigent Defendant For Non-
Payment Of Fine. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686(1966). Defendant appealed a conviction of assault in the third de-
gree.' He was ordered imprisoned for one year and was also fined$500; if not paid, the fine was to be served out at the rate of one day's
imprisonment for each dollar remaining unpaid.2 Since defendant was
known to the trial court to be an indigent and thus unable to pay
the fine, the practical result of the sentence was to incarcerate defendant
for an additional 500 days. In reversing the conviction, the Court of
Appeals of New York gave two grounds for its decision. The court
noted, first, that even though there was an ancient practice of in-
carcerating a criminal defendant for the non-payment of a fine, such
incarceration was not part of the imprisonment but only a means of
collecting the fine against an offender who refused payment.3 Thus,
the court held that confinement of a -bona fide indigent defendant
violated the meaning and intent of -section 484 of the New York Code
of Criminal Procedure.' On constitutional grounds, the court stated
that it was a denial of equal protection of the law to allow defendant's
inability to pay a fine to determine the length of his confinement 5
since this was said to result in unequal treatment of solvent and insol-
vent offenders. Also, the $500 fine for a common misdemeanor' was
held to be constitutionally excessive because defendant in reality would
be jailed for a period far longer than the normal period for the offense
and would be unable to earn a livelihood for an additional 500 days.
In past cases involving similar sentences,' but not involving
known indigent offenders, most courts have held that such incarcera-
1. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245 (McKinney 1944): "Assault in the third degree ispunishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than$500, or both."
2. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 484 (McKinney 1945) : "A judgment that the defen-dant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine be satisfied;
specifying the extent of the imprisonment, which cannot exceed one day for every one
dollar of the fine .. "
, 3. Shoop v. State, 209 Ark. 642, 192 S.W.2d 122 (1946); State v. Bogue, 142Mont. 459, 384 P.2d 749 (1963) ; City of Buffalo v. Murphy, 228 App. Div. 279, 239N.Y.S. 206 (1930) ; see generally Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1283 (1940).
4. 218 N.E.2d at 687.
5. Id. at 688.
6. Assault in the third degree or simple assault is a misdemeanor in New York.People v. Katz, 290 N.Y. 361, 49 N.E.2d 482 (1943) ; People v. Rytel, 284 N.Y. 242,
30 N.E.2d 578 (1940).
7. In a recent federal habeas corpus proceeding involving a New York stateprisoner, defendant, an indigent, claimed his eighth and fourteenth amendment rights
were violated when he received a thirty day jail sentence plus a $500 fine and, in default
of payment, sixty additional days in jail. Even though the fact situation was almostidentical to that of the instant case, the district court denied prisoner's eighth amend-
ment contentions because he received less than the maximum sentence allowed by the
statute and theoretically could have received a straight one year prison term with nofine which would have exceeded prisoner's actual term by nine months. The court alsodenied his fourteenth amendment claim by stating that defendant did not receive his
sentence because he was an indigent, but because he was convicted of a crime. As a
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tion was legal on both statutory and constitutional grounds,' although
there is some question as to whether in the absence of statutory pro-
visions such confinement was justified at common law.' With few
exceptions,1" the instant case departs from the prevailing view in this
area.
In a prior New York case,1' a lower court held that defendant's
inability to pay a fine did not render the fine unreasonable or excessive
and, moreover, section 484 was said to disclose a legislative intent
that the -inability to pay a fine should not constitute a legal objection to
the fine. The court added that the state should not be relegated to the
ineffective remedy of a civil action to enforce the fine. 2  Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee recently held that an indigent mother
convicted of child neglect could be confined until she worked off
the costs of her trial.'" Twisting the equal protection argument, the
court held that to allow an indigent defendant to escape payment of
his fine would deny the financially able defendant of his right to
equal protection of the laws because he alone would be held responsi-
ble for his fines. 4 In effect, that court stated that the objective of the
American judicial system was to balance the interests of society as
against those of the individual and concluded that the interest of the
state in enforcing its judgments was superior to the defendant's
inability to pay her fine.
In rare opposition to the prevailing view is a recent New York
County Court decision,' 5 which held that a $250 fine or 250 days injail alternative, in addition to a prison term, did deprive the defendant
of his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws8 because
caveat, however, the district court did find that defendant's constitutional claims
would have been much stronger had defendant received the maximum sentence allowed
by law, i.e., the same sentence defendant received in the instant case. United States
ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
8. Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833) ; Adjmi v. State, 139 So. 2d
179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ; People ex rel. Price v. Hayes, 151 App. Div. 561, 136
N.Y.S. 854 (1912).
9. The authorities as to the common law practice are not clear. Compare Ex
parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833) and 8 ENCYL. PL. & PRAC. 961 (18 .),
where defendant stands committed until his fine is paid, with People v. Velarde, 45
Cal. App. 520, 188 Pac. 59 (1920) and 1 BIsHoP, NEw CRIM. PROC"D. § 1307 (4th ed.
1895), where imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine is invalid at common law.
10. United States v. Doe, 101 F. Supp. 609 (D. Conn. 1951) ; People v. Collins,
47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1965 Sup. Ct.) ; People v. Johnson, 24 App. Div. 2d
577, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965).
11. People v. Watson, 204 Misc. 467, 126 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1953).
12. See Judge Cardozo's comment in Chapman v. Seloer, 225 N.Y. 417, 421, 122
N.E. 206, 207 (1919).
13. State ex rel. Dillehay v. White, 398 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. 1966).
14. At least one New York court seems to reject any argument that sentences
for the same offense must be equal. People ex rel. Loos v. Redman, 48 Misc. 2d 592,
265 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
15. People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
16. From a practical viewpoint, any sentencing policy that imposes fines beyond
the capacity of a defendant to pay has been criticized as being unsound:
Like any judicial order which is not enforced it breeds disrespect for thejudicial process. It tends to encourage lack of executive diligence in the collection
of fines which with due diligence are collectible. If accompanied by a sentence
of confinement it constitutes an arbitrary obstruction to parole and creates unde-
19671
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there is no way -to equate payment of a fine with imprisonment. 17
However, the same court did not sustain defendant's eighth amend-
ment claim and held that the penalties imposed by the legislature were
neither cruel nor unusual.'
The problem in question has not arisen in cases of federal
criminal convictions because the Federal Poor Convict Law allows
an insolvent criminal defendant to secure his release after a thirty day
confinement for nonpayment of a fine.'" At present, the constitutionality
of the thirty day confinement period has not been challenged."0 The
Model Penal Code recommends confinement for nonpayment only if
the default is willful and contumacious,21 but English statutes give
no consideration to the indigent defendant's inability to pay his fine.22
Maryland has a statute similar to the federal statute, but the
minimum period of confinement varies according to the amount of the
fine.23  Only once has the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled on the
constitutionality of imprisonment of an indigent defendant for non-
payment of a fine under this statute.24 In Cohen v. State,25 the court
specifically held that notwithstanding defendant's inability to pay the
fine, his sentence was neither cruel nor unusual.26 Although this decision
sirable custodial problems. By obstructing economic rehabilitation, in the long
run it operates to foment rather than to deter crime.
United States v. Doe, 101 F. Supp. 609, 613 n.6 (D. Conn. 1951).
17. Attempting to distinguish and dismiss the Collins case, the court in Redinan
stated that, in Collins the question of confinement of the indigent defendant came before
the court "upon an appeal from a Court of Special Sessions and such case in question
of the severity of the sentence was presented for review. Strictly speaking, thus the
holding of unconstitutionality was not a prerequisite to the exercise of the power to
modify." 265 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
18. Some cases hold that imprisonment on failure to pay a fine by an indigent
defendant is neither cruel and unusual nor excessive. E.g., Ex parte Ellis, 76 Kan. 368,
91 Pac. 81 (1907) ; People v. Kelly, 32 Misc. 319, 66 N.Y.S. 733 (1900).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3569 (1964) :
When a poor convict, sentenced for violation of any law of the United States
by any court established by enactment of Congress, to be imprisoned and pay a
fine, or fine and costs, or to pay a fine, or fine and costs, has been confined in
prison thirty days, solely for the nonpayment of such fine, or fine and costs, such
convict may make application in writing to the nearest United States Commis-
sioner in the district where he is imprisoned setting forth his inability to pay such
fine or fine and costs, and after notice to the district attorney for the United
States, who may appear, offer evidence, and be heard, the commissioner shall
proceed to hear and determine the matter.
20. Some federal courts have interpreted the Federal Poor Convict Law, but have
not attempted to construe its validity. Clemmer v. Alexander, 295 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.
1961) ; Vogel v. Wong, 178 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Pratt, 23 F.2d
333 (D.N.H. 1927) ; People v. Dist. of Columbia, 75 A.2d 845 (D.C. Mun. App. 1950).
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.2, comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
Although the MPC provides for special consideration of the good faith indigent
defendant, such consideration is at the discretion of the trial court.
22. Criminal Justice Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, §§ 14-15. See also Rex v.
Brook [1949] 2 K.B. 138.
23. MD. CODE ANN. art. 5, § 39 (1957) ; art. 38, §§ 1, 4 (1957).
24. Dean v. State, 98 Md. 80, 56 Atl. 481 (1903) ; see also 40 Ors. A'r'"Y GEN.
199 (1955).
25. Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 195 Atl. 532 (1937), reargument denied, 173 Md.
216, 196 Atl. 819 (1938), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 660 (1938).
26. Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states, "that excessive bail
ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment
inflicted by the Courts of law." Thus, in Maryland, if a punishment is grossly and
inordinately disappropriate to the offense, the judgment ought to be reversed unless
the trial judge exercised his discretion conscientiously. Mitchell v. State, 82 Md. 527,
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may be read as precluding a statutory interpretation similar to that
in the New York Court of Appeals decision in People v. Saffore, the
constitutionality of the statute as applied to tndigents under the equal
protection clause remains an open question in Maryland2 7
LOYALTY OATHS - Loyalty Oath Requirements Of Mary-
land's Subversive Activities Act Held Constitutional. Whitehill v.
Elkins, 258 F. Supp. 589 (1966). The plaintiff, employed as a guest
lecturer in English at the University of Maryland, executed an employ-
ment contract for the academic year 1966-1967, but declined to execute
a loyalty oath contained in a document called a "Certification of
Applicant for Public Employment."' Upon 'being advised that he
could not be employed at the University until he executed the oath,
the plaintiff brought suit before a three-judge district court,2 asking
that the oath be declared unconstitutional and that the defendants be
enjoined from preventing the consummation of his contract with the
University of Maryland.
Recognizing that the ,specific wording of the current oath had been
upheld by the Supreme Court in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of
Elections,8 the plaintiff maintained the validity of Gerende had been
impaired by later decisions in Baggett v. Bullitt4 and Elfbrandt v.
34 Atl. 246 (1896). However, in Maryland, punishment within statutory limits is not
cruel or unusual. Duff v. State, 229 Md. 126, 182 A.2d 349 (1962).
27. The application of the equal protection doctrine in the criminal field is a
relatively new and growing phenomenon, and a 1937 decision would not conclude a
question in this area. See generally Comment, 27 MD. L. Rv. 154 (1967).
1. CERTIFICATION or APPLICANT FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT. Required by Law
(Art. 85A, Paragraph 13, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957).
I do hereby certify that I am not engaged in one
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the Government of the United States,
or the State of Maryland, or any political subdivision of either of them, by force
or violence.
I further certify that I understand the aforegoing statement is made subject
to the penalties of perjury prescribed in Article 27, Section 439 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland (1957 edition).
Portions of article 85A, § 1.13, which in effect had been declared unconstitutional in
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), were removed from the oath on recommenda-
tion of the Maryland Attorney General. Attorney General's Press Release, May 3, 1966.
2. The three-judge district court is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) and
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964), where an injunction is sought restraining the enforcement
of a state statute upon the grounds of unconstitutionality. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964),
allows either party direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
3. 341 U.S. 56 (1951). The oath held valid was required of candidates for public
office to obtain a place on the ballot and stated that they are not engaged "in one way
or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence" and that
they are not knowingly members of an organization engaged in such an attempt.
4. 377 U.S. 360 (1964). The oath under consideration was applicable to all state
employees and incorporated the Washington Subversive Activities Act of 1951 pro-
hibiting employment to a subversive person defined as:
[Alny person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commis-
sion, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit,
attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow,
destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the
constitutional form of government of the United States, or of the state of Wash-
ington, or any political subdivision of either of them by revolution, force, or
violence; or who ... becomes or remains a member of a subversive organization
1967] 203
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Russell.5 The latter cases struck down oaths requiring the affiant
to state that he was not knowingly a member of an organization seek-
ing to overthrow the state or federal government. Such a provision
was upheld in Gerende,8 and, therefore, in the principal case plaintiff
argued that Gerende as a whole was not entitled to significant weight
on the issue of whether the oath and its supporting statutes were
unconstitutionally vague. The plaintiff launched a broad attack on
loyalty oaths as a condition to public employment, arguing that the
Maryland statutes do not provide for a judicial hearing prior to a
final determination and are, therefore, arbitrary and discrimina-
tory.7 Even if such a hearing were provided, the plaintiff maintained
that the oaths are invalid because they operate to invade constitu-
tionally protected freedoms with no showing of a reasonable relation
between the oath requirements and the state's interest in keeping
subversive persons from obtaining state employment." Plaintiff also
[With knowledge that it is a subversive organization] or a foreign subversive
organization.
WASH. CODE ANN. § 9.81.010(5) (1961). The court struck down the statute as too
broad because it proscribed "guiltless knowing behavior" and was, therefore, too vague.
For a discussion of the case and past loyalty oath decisions, see Note, 25 MD. L. Rzv. 64
(1965) ; Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 268 (1951).
5. 384 U.S. 11 (1966). State employees in Arizona were required to take an oath
to support the federal and state constitutions and state laws. The employee was
subject to perjury and discharge if he ". .. knowingly and willfully becomes or remains
a member of the communist party of the United States or its successors or any of its
subordinate organizations or any other organization having for one of its purposes
the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the State of Arizona or any
of its political subdivisions. . . ." ARIz. RXv. STAT. § 38-231E (1965 Supp.). The
oath was held unconstitutionally broad because its provisions presume conclusively
that those who join a "subversive" organization share its unlawful aims. See Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), where the Court held that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment was violated by a state statute which excluded individuals
from employment solely on the basis of organization membership. In Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), New York's Education Law, which establishes
a presumption that a member of the Communist Party is ineligible for state employ-
ment, was challenged. The statute was previously upheld in Adler v. Board of Educa-
tion, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), where the Court said that the presumption of ineligibility
based on membership in a listed organization was reasonable since "the relationship
between the fact found and the presumption is clear and direct and is not conclusive,
[and therefore] the requirements of due process are satisfied." 342 U.S. at 496. In
Keyishian, the Court struck down the provision because the presumption could only
be rebutted by (a) a denial of membership; (b) by a denial that the organization
advocates overthrow by force; or (c) by a denial that the teacher had knowledge of
such advocacy. Therefore, proof of non-active membership or the absence of intent
to further the aims would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), stated that "constitutional pro-
tection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory." 344 U.S. at 192. See Adler v. Board of Educa-
tion, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 255 F. Supp. 981 (W.D.N.Y.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
8. The plaintiff argued that loyalty oath statutes inhibit personal freedom by
causing conscientious individuals not to seek state employment, even though they are
qualified. In Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), petitioners were fined for
violating an ordinance requiring them to furnish membership lists of the local NAACP
branch. The judgment was reversed, the Court saying that where personal free-
dom is threatened, the state must show a compelling interest and must show that
its action "bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental
purpose asserted as its justification." 361 U.S. at 525. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). Compare Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (upholding
statute requiring membership list of Ku Klux Klan). In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960), the Court invalidated an Arkansas statute requiring teachers to list every
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alleged that the oath was a bill of attainder against him,9 and that
it incorporates the clearly unconstitutional provisions of article 85A,
thereby rendering the oath itself invalid.10 Plaintiff's final argument
was to the effect that the Attorney General of Maryland had no au-
thority to ,sever the oath into its valid and invalid provisions since the
sections of the statute are so intertwined that the legislature would not
have passed one without the other."
The court upheld the oath pointing to the majority opinion in
Baggett v. Bullitt, which expressly stated that Gerende was still good
law'" and that none of the later decisions had impaired that portion
of the oath presently under consideration. The court went on to say
that the oath did not have to be read in conjunction with the sup-
porting -statutes and that it was clearly severable under article 85A,
section 18Y1
organization to which they belonged or to which they contributed for five years. The
Court said that even though the state's purpose might be legitimate, they could not
use a means which stifles personal freedom where the goals could be achieved by less
harmful means. Plaintiff in the present case argued that any benefit obtained by
loyalty oaths could be achieved by ordinary criminal process.
9. This argument was dismissed as being without merit. In Garner v. Board of
Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), the Supreme Court recognized that a municipal
employer could inquire into matters which were relevant to an employee's fitness and
suitability for public service and that a reasonable restriction of the political activities
of employees is valid. But cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). A bill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). A legislative prohibition can attach to pre-
scribed activities but not to named organizations or' persons without a full hearing
subject to judicial review. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Plaintiff in
the present case argued that the Maryland statutes constituted an attainder against
him because a refusal to sign the oath automatically disqualified him from employment
with no provision for a hearing or judicial review. MD. CODE ANN. art. 85A, §§ 11, 13(1957). See Keyishian v. Board of Regents 255 F. Supp. 981 (W.D.N.Y. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 589 (19675, where New York's Education Law,
note 5 supra, was held not to be a bill of attainder because disqualification did not
follow automatically from a legislative determination since an employee could, at a
hearing, introduce rebutting evidence.
10. The provisions of MD. CODE ANN. art. 85A, §§ 1, 13 (1957), defining sub-
versive persons are substantially identical to the statute struck down in Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), note 4 supra. Article 85A, § 10, states that no sub-
versive person as defined in the article shall be eligible for public office or employedin state government. Article 85A, §§ 11, 13, impose the oath requirements, and article
85A, § 1, defines subversive person in clearly unconstitutional language. Without these
sections, there would be no statutory authority for requiring the oath or for imposing
the penalty for perjury for false swearing. See Judge Sobeloff's concurring opinion
in the principal case expressing grave doubts about not judging the oath in conjunction
with the supporting statutes.
11. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935), a
compulsory pension system for employees of interstate carriers was struck down as
not within the commerce power. The statute, 45 U.S.C. §§ 201-14, contained a sepa-
rability clause, but the Court said that it only operated to reverse the presumption
that the act must operate as an entirety; however, the Court "cannot rewrite a statute
and give it an effect altogether different from that sought by the measure viewed as a
whole." 295 U.S. at 362. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), where the Court recognizes
that the presumption is reversed by a separability provision in a statute.
12. 377 U.S. 360, 368 n.7 (1964). In answering the dissenting opinion's state-
ment that Gerende had been overruled, the Court said it did not pass on the definition
of a subversive person in the Maryland statutes, but only on the actual oath to be
administered. Perhaps it is significant to note that when the Court quoted the portions
of the oath approved in Gerende, it omitted the phrase "in one way or another."
13. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 85A, § 18 (1957), provides:
If any provision, phrase, or clause of this article or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other
1967]
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The district court's decision has far from settled the question of
whether Maryland's loyalty oath is valid. The court obviously felt
that the issue could only properly be determined by the Supreme Court
since it had specifically upheld the provisions under attack. Aside
from the question of the validity of the supporting statutes, and whether
they are to be read in conjunction with the oath, it appears likely
that the phrase "engaged in one way or another in an attempt to over-
throw the Government of the United States"'1 4 will be viewed as
proscribing too great an area of activity in that it requires the con-
scientious individual to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone than
if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked"15 and,
therefore, unconstitutionally interferes with first amendment freedoms.
The problem lies in determining what minimum activity will be deemed
engaging in the attempt to overthrow the government.'" In loyalty
oath cases" and in other situations," the Court has recently required
definite notice as to what acts or activities are prohibited or disclaimed.
The Whitehill case is now pending before the Supreme Court, and
it seems likely that the Court will deem the oath in question to be too
indefinite under this standard.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Landlord's "Right To Exculpate
Himself" Makes His Consent To Search Binding On The Tenant.
United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966). After com-
mencing operations in a newly opened retail sporting goods store in
Huntington, New York, the defendant rented a small shack in
Sayville, New York. The owner retained a key and, at the request of
the defendant, agreed to unlock the shack to permit daily deliveries of
merchandise to be stored inside. He was provided with funds to pay
freight expenses on delivery. Upon receipt of a complaint that defen-
dant was using the shack to receive and store merchandise obtained
on the credit rating of a wholly unrelated enterprise in Sayville, Postal
provisions, phrases, or clauses or applications of this article which can be given
effect without the invalid provision, phrase, or clause or application, and to this
end the provisions, phrases and clauses of this article are declared to be severable.
14. See note 1 supra.
15. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). See NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963), quoting in part from Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958),
where the Court said the true objection to vagueness was not lack of notice, but the
impingement on first amendment freedoms.
16. Although it might be argued that the present oath on its face, note 1 supra,
does not clearly eliminate guilt by association, the state contends that "in one way or
another" is allied with the word "attempt" so as to embrace the concept of a criminal
attempt requiring the intent to overthrow the government, and a direct act done
towards its commission. Moreover, the removal of the provision of the prior oath
relating to knowing membership in a subversive organization would indicate that the
oath on its face requires something more than knowing association with a proscribed
organization.
17. See note 15 supra.
18. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), decided after the
present case, the Court struck down section 3021 of the New York Education Law
providing for removal of teachers for the "utterance of any treasonable or seditious
words" or the doing of "treasonable or seditious" acts. The Court said that the teacher
could not know where the line is drawn between seditious and non-seditious utterances
or acts and that the necessity of such a line is crucial. See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11, 18 (1966) ; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
[VOL. XXVII
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Inspectors, who, at this point, had no search warrant, went -to the
shack to investigate. The owner, concerned that he might be involved
in an illegal activity, fully disclosed the circumstances of the rental
and invited the Inspectors to examine the contents of the shack.
As a result of this examination, the Inspectors obtained a listing
of shippers from which they later received a copy of a purchase order
containing the fraudulent credit rating. On the strength of this
information, arrest and search warrants were issued and defendant
was subsequently found guilty on thirteen counts of using -the mails
in a scheme to defraud' and 'on one count of assuming a fictitious
name or address to promote a fraud.2 On appeal, the major question
was whether the owner's consent -to the search was 'binding on the
defendant, thus rendering the search reasonable.
The court, speaking through Judge Kaufman, upheld the search.
Noting that the protection afforded unoccupied premises may diminish,3
it distinguished Chapman v. United States4 and the Hotel Cases' on
the grounds that ;in none of those cases was the landlord an unwitting
but active accomplice in the tenant's illegal activities. The court ruled
that a landlord has a "right to promptly and voluntarily exculpate
himself" where the landlord's innocent activities are "inextricably
intertwined with [the defendant's] alleged scheme and cast suspicion
upon him . . .his authorization of the inspection when viewed in its
full context rendered the search reasonable."6
The dissenting opinion, stressing that the owner's authority was
limited, reasoned that since the consent of one in complete possession
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1948).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1948).
3. In Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962), the defendant had
abandoned his rented room, and a search with the consent of the landlord was held
reasonable. The decision indicates that protection extends only to a place of occupancy.
See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) ; Buettner v. State, 233 Md. 235, 196
A.2d 465 (1964).
4. 365 U.S. 610 (1961), noted in 37 NoTR" DAMr LAW. 250 (1961). Police
officers with the consent of the landlord searched defendant's rented house and found
a distillery. The Court held that the evidence was inadmissible, ruling that the land-
lord's common law right to enter and view waste could not be delegated to law en-
forcement officers. See Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1931) (right of
entry under lease).
5. Police had no right to believe that hotel clerk had been authorized by the
defendant to permit police to search. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) ; United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). See People v. Hicks, 165 Cal. App. 2d 548,
331 P.2d 1003 (1958), where defendant was a hotel guest and had a key to a storage
room but not exclusive control; consent by the hotel manager was binding.
6. 364 F.2d 542, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1966), where the defendant gave an unlocked
briefcase to his landlady instructing her not to give it to anyone else and the landlady
informed the FBI, the court stated:
Mrs. Caldwell had no reason to become involved in the crime by allowing her
apartment and herself to be used as a hiding place . . . when possession and
control of his briefcase is given by a man to another person we think that man
accepts the risk that the other person will consent to a search and seizure of it
and, under the circumstances that exist in this case, such consent is valid.
Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1010 (1966). See United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962),
holding that the consent to a search of an automobile by a gratuitous bailee did not
exceed the authority or dominion entrusted to him and his consent was binding on the
defendant. See also Von Eichelberger v. United States, 252 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1958).
See generally 23 MD. L. Riv. 93 (1963).
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may not make a search reasonable,7 the consent of a party with a
limited right of entry is less effective. Where there is this limited
right, the dissent maintains that it must be clearly shown "that the
absent person has made the consenting party his agent to consent."
Since the owner was not engaged in receiving shipments at the time
of 'his consent he could not have been acting as an agent. The dissent
argues that the activities of the owner were irrelevant, neither increas-
ing his dominion over the property nor creating an 'agency.
The fourth amendment protects the right of privacy of an owner
or occupier from unreasonable searches of his premises. Where consent
to a search is given by a third party, most cases regard the existence
of his -possession and control a primary element in determining
whether the search is reasonable -and the consent binding on the
defendant.' Consent to a search without a warrant by a third party
who is an owner or tenant 'is binding on his guest.'" Consent is also
binding where the -third party 'and the defendant have joint control
of the premises," where the defendant denies an interest tin the prem-
ises," or where the defendant has left the premises in control of the
third party.'" Mere ownership interest or limited right of access with-
out substantial control or dominion over the property does not usually
give the power to make a binding consent. Consequently, consent by a
landlord 'is generally not binding on a defendant tenant solely on the
basis of a landlord's ownership and limited right -to enter 4 or by
other third party owners residing 'in the same -household where the
7. See 364 F.2d 542, 551 (2d Cir. 1966); Reeves v. Warden, Md. State Peni-
tentiary, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
8. In Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1931), the court, holding the
search unreasonable, stated: "Agency means more than passive permission; it involves
request, instruction, or command," and found that the landlord had no right to permit
officers to enter on any business except his own. The Supreme Court has recognized
that a valid consent may be given through an agent, but has also said: "Our decisions
make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded
by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent
authority.'" Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964).
9. McGuire v. State, 200 Md. 601, 92 A.2d 582 (1952). See Johnson v. United
States, 358 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1966); Hall v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 677 (Ky.
1953). See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1953); DAvis, FEDERAL SgARCHUS
AND SEizuRsS 200-15 (1964).
10. United States ex reL McKenna v. Myers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1964)(consent by mother who owned house binding on son); McGuire v. State, 200 Md. 601,
92 A.2d 582 (1952) ; People v. Kortwright, 236 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (owner's
consent binding on casual visitor).
11. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
935 (1954) ; United States v. Thompson, 113 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940) ; United States
v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1961). The latter cases hold that the consent
of one partner in a business is binding on the other. See, e.g., Stein v. United States,
166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948), where the wife's consent was binding on the husband
since she held joint title in the premises. See People v. Hicks, 165 Cal. 2d 548, 331
P.2d 1003 (1958). In People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955), a search
was held reasonable where the landlord believed he had joint control and gave consent.
12. E.g., Driskill v. United States, 281 Fed. 146 (9th Cir. 1922); Bucholtz v.
Warden, Md. State Penitentiary, 233 Md. 614, 195 A.2d 690 (1963).
13. E.g., United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), where the
defendant's wife was in charge of the house while her husband was in the attic
operating a distillery, and the court held her consent was binding on the husband;
Hook v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 672, 181 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
14. E.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) ; Klee v. United States,
53 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1931); Hall v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1953);
Miller v. State, 174 Md. 362, 198 Atl. 710 (1938).
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area searched is designated as reserved for the personal effects of the
defendant.' 5 There is a split in the cases on whether a wife can consent
for her husband.'" An interesting recent Maryland decision indicated
that the possession of a key gave the wife "constructive possession" of
her husband's railway station locker sufficient to consent to a search.' 7
Behind the doctrines arising out of common factual situations, the
true test for the admissibility of seized evidence is whether the search
is reasonable under the circumstances.' 8  In the present case, the
court appears to be stressing the reasonableness of the motives prompt-
ing consent rather than the crucial issue of whether there has been a
reasonable invasion of the defendant's right to be free from a warrant-
less search. The opinion indicates that the fourth amendment cannot
be applied as a restraint on the reasonable actions of the consenting
party. The prohibition was never intended as a restraint on private
citizens, but as a restraint on the investigative power of government.
The focus should be on the actions of the investigators 9 and the
inferences they might draw on the validity of the consent after having
been fully apprised of the landlord's relationship with the defendant.
While the motive for consent would be relevant to a valid waiver in
a prosecution against the consenting party, it becomes irrelevant to
the determination of a valid waiver against this defendant.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - New Requirements For Consent.
United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966). The
defendant Blalock was approached by federal agents who had not
obtained a warrant. The officers frisked him and then accompanied him
to his hotel room where they briefly interrogated him concerning a
bank robbery under investigation. After Blalock denied any knowledge
of the robbery, the officers asked him whether he objected to their
searching his room. Blalock replied that he had no objection. Marked
stolen bank notes were found during the search. On motion to suppress
-the notes, the court found there was no valid consent to the search and
held that the fourth amendment' requires no less a standard of waiver
15. Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849(D. Md. 1961); Reeves v. Warden, Md. State Penitentiary, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir.
1965), held that a mother's consent did not extend to a bureau set aside for the defen-
dant's exclusive use.
16. E.g., State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963) (wife may not consent
for husband) ; Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952). Contra, United
States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (D.C.N.Y. 1937); Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368,
196 A.2d 891 (1964).
17. Guttridge v. State, 236 Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557 (1964).
18. Woodward v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See Burge v.
United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965) ; Driskill
v. United States, 281 Fed. 146 (9th Cir. 1922).
19. It is generally recognized that failure to obtain a warrant where the evidence
is not likely to be immediately destroyed or removed is strong evidence of an unrea-
sonable search. E.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). This point was
raised in the present case, but was passed over with only the cursory comment that,
notwithstanding the force of the argument, the circumstances justified the search.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
1967]
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than do the fifth and sixth amendments. The waiver must be voluntary
and intelligent; that is, the defendant must actually know of his consti-
tutional right to demand that the police obtain a search warrant before
he can be said to have "waived" that right. Therefore the court con-
cluded the law will not presume the defendant knows of this right,
and therefore the police must formally warn the subject of his fourth
amendment rights before an effective "waiver" can occur.
Constitutional rights as to searches and seizures may be waived.2
The waiver must be proven 'by clear and positive testimony, and there
must be no duress or coercion, actual or implied.' The government
must show a consent that is "unequivocal and specific,".4 "freely and in-
telligently given. ' Since waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,6 courts have said
they will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights. It has been held that entry under
color of office and submission to authority is not a waiver' and that
words of invitation to police officers to enter and look around are not
to be taken as a valid waiver.8 Thus, it would seem that under the
law of search and seizure existing prior to the principal case, the court
could have found an absence of consent on the facts of the case with-
out extending the requirements to 'include a formal warning of the
subject's rights. However, in light of the 'holding in Miranda v. Arizona
that the fifth and the sixth amendments require that the accused be
informed of his constitutional rights,9 this extension does not seem
unwarranted. Moreover, since the fourth amendment by way of the
fourteenth is applicable in full upon the states, 10 it seems reasonable
to extend the warning requirement to the fourth amendment."
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
2. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
3. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
4. Karwicki v. United States, 55 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1932).
5. Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931). These requirements of
effective waiver were applied in Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
and in Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
6. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ; Cipres v. United States, 343
F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965).
7. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
8. The court in Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951), stated
at 651: "Conceivably, that is the calm statement of an innocent man; conceivably,
again, it is but the false bravado of the small-time criminal." See Catalanotte v. United
States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Karwicki v. United States, 55 F.2d 225 (4th
Cir. 1932).
9. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. Several suggestions have been promoted to further safeguard the individual's
rights under the fourth amendment; the warning requirement holding of the principal
case was advanced in a comment on consent in 113 U. PA. L. Rnv. 260, 268 (1964).
Justice Nathan R. Sobel suggests that where officers cannot get a warrant due to
nebulous or absent probable cause, a written consent document should be executed
before the judge. SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN LAW OV SEARCH AND SEIZURE 128
(1964). The most radical view is to exclude all evidence in the absence of a valid
warrant. See Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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SUPREME COURT - Procedural Rules As Adequate State
Grounds. O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966). At defendant's
trial for larceny the prosecutor commented to the jury on the failure
of the accused to testify in his own defense. Because such comment
was acceptable under current Ohio practice, defendant raised no objec-
tion. Defendant was convicted, his conviction affirmed by the Ohio
Court of Appeals, and his appeal dismissed by the Ohio Supreme
Court. While defendant was seeking review in the United States
Supreme Court, that Court handed down its decision in Griffin v.
California,' which held that a prosecutor's comment in a state court
upon an accused's failure to testify violated his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. Defendant based his petition for certiorari
on this new rule.2 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case for consideration in the light of Griffin.3 On re-
mand, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction on
the ground that it could refuse to consider a claim of error not raised
in the trial court.' The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
defendant's constitutional right could still be asserted in spite of his
failure to comply with the Ohio procedural rule. The Ohio procedural
rule was deemed not to be an adequate state ground for the decision,
because the Court felt it would be unreasonable to require defendant
to anticipate the Griffin decision by registering a futile objection
at trial.
The doctrine of adequate state grounds provides that where a
state judgment rests on an independent state ground, which in itself
demands a particular disposition of the case, the Supreme Court has
no jurisdiction to review the federal questions presented.5 An effect
1. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The foundation for the Griffin decision was laid in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), in which the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was made applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
2. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), held that the
Griffin rule would not be applied in cases final on the date of the Griffin decision,
but indicated Griffin would be applied to cases pending appeal on that date.
3. 382 U.S. 286 (1965).
4. State v. O'Connor, 6 Ohio St. 2d 169, 217 N.E.2d 685 (1966).
5. The doctrine was first articulated in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590 (1874). Under the Murdock approach, the Court would first
examine the federal question itself to determine if the state court had decided it
correctly. If the federal issue had been correctly resolved, the Court would affirm
the state judgment; if it had not, the Court would then consider the adequacy of the
state ground. Under the more modern approach developed in Fox Film Corp. v.
Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935), the Court first weighs the adequacy of the state ground,
refusing to consider the federal question unless the state ground is found insufficient.
Although the two methods of applying the doctrine differ, they both achieve the
same practical result - to deny the Court jurisdiction where the state ground is
adequate. It should be noted, however, that the Fox approach is consistent with the
rationale underlying the adequate state grounds doctrine, while the Murdock approach
is not. The rationale was stated in Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945), as
follows: "We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal
laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion." The Mur-
dock method of applying the doctrine resulted in dictum on the federal question, in that
the federal question was considered by the Court first. Such dictum was no more than
an advisory opinion. The Fox approach, by requiring the adequacy of the state ground
to be determined initially, cures the defect associated with the Murdock approach.
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of this doctrine has been to permit the forfeiture of federal rights
through failure to comply with state procedural requirements.6 How-
ever, the Court has been reluctant to allow such forfeitures where
-it is obvious that the procedural rule is being used expressly to evade
Supreme Court review of important federal issues. Generally, the
Court has found state procedural grounds inadequate when they have
posed unreasonable obstacles to the vindication of federal rights or
when they were inconsistently applied to achieve a discriminatory
purpose.7 The doctrine was never seriously challenged, however, until
the Court's decision in Fay v. Noia,8 which virtually destroyed its
operation in federal habeas corpus proceedings. A state prisoner can
now have his federal claim considered in a federal court regardless of
the adequacy of the state grounds upon which the judgment of the
state courts rests.
The Fay ruling set the stage for the Court's enigmatic opinion
in Henry v. Mississippi.9 The Henry case involved a default under a
state "contemporaneous objection" rule requiring timely objection to
illegal evidence as a prerequisite for appellate review. The Court
declined to consider whether or not the rule was an adequate state
ground until after the state supreme court had determined if defen-
dant had voluntarily waived his federal rights for tactical purposes.
After disposing of the case on this narrow basis, the Court launched
into a broad discussion of the application of the adequate state grounds
doctrine to state procedural rules, concluding that such rules could
be adequate state grounds only if they served a "legitimate state
interest." This vague dictum has left the status of the doctrine highly
unsettled. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Henry, warned that the
6. See Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953) ; Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
571 (1948) ; Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 490 (1919) ; Baldwin
v. Kansas, 129 U.S. 52 (1889).
7. See Comment, 61 COLUM. L. Rev. 255 (1961). In Davis v. Wechsler, 263
U.S. 22, 25 (1923), the Court held that "local practice shall not be allowed to put
unreasonable obstacles in the way" of federal substantive rights. Brown v. Western
Railway, 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949), stated: "Strict local rules of pleading cannot be
used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal
laws." In Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) and NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), state procedural rules were found to be in-
adequate state grounds because they were applied inconsistently. In the NAACP
decision, at 457-58, the Court explained: "Novelty in procedural requirements cannot
be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified
reliance on prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitu-
tional rights." Where the Court refused to enforce a default of federal rights through
non-compliance with a state procedural rule, it justified its departure from the
adequate state grounds doctrine by concluding that the question of when a state pro-
cedural rule can preclude consideration of a defendant's federal rights is itself a
federal question, subject to Supreme Court review. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443 (1965) ; Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964) ; Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442
(1900). Thus the Court has sometimes indulged in a kind of balancing process in
which the state's legitimate interest in the procedural requirement is weighed against
the importance of the federal right allegedly violated.
8. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay held that the Supreme Court has the power to
grant habeas corpus to a state prisoner regardless of the adequacy of state pro-
cedural grounds for conviction. The adequate state grounds doctrine thus would
apply only to direct appellate review. The defendant in Fay did not exhaust his
available state remedies; to grant such a prisoner federal habeas corpus seriously
impairs the finality of state judgments.
9. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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majority language foreshadowed an extension of the Fay ruling to
direct review. 10 On the other hand, the majority opinion, on its face,
appears to be nothing more than a recapitulation of the earlier law
in the area." It seems more likely that Henry is an attempt to strike
a middle ground between the traditional practice of permitting for-
feiture of federal rights through non-compliance with state procedure
and the more radical approach adopted in Fay.2
The instant case provided the Court with an opportunity to
clarify the uncertain position taken in Henry. Unfortunately, the
Court based its decision solely on the unreasonableness of requiring
defendant to anticipate Griffin with a vain objection. This reasoning
is strikingly similar to that used in Herndon v. Georgia,"3 in which
the Court concluded that the defendant would not forfeit his federal
claim if he could not reasonably have anticipated a decision recon-
struing the state statute involved in the case.1 4 In the light of this
similarity, it is possible that the Court genuinely intends to continue
to rely on settled principles. It is more likely, however, that the Court
is merely reluctant to take a definitive new stand on the issue until
it is squarely presented. The O'Connor decision, because of the narrow
scope of its facts, has questionable value as an indicator of the course
of future decisions.
10. Id. at 457. If Justice Harlan's forebodings are correct, it appears likely
that valuable state procedural requirements will be impaired once again. Such an
impairment would not be as significant in practical effect as it might appear, because
no more than a few cases each year on direct review to the Supreme Court have
been disposed of by the state courts on state procedural grounds.
11. Justice Brennan's opinion in Henry contains the repeated assurance that the
Court will apply only "settled principles" in considering the adequacy of state pro-
cedural grounds. The legitimate state interest test recommended in Henry has been
called a "fair synthesis of prior decisions." 65 COLUM. L. Rgv. 710, 713 (1965).
There are indications, however, that the Court is suggesting a departure from the
earlier cases. It is by no means certain that the situation in Henry warranted such
a sweeping treatment of the doctrine. The Mississippi Supreme Court had recognized
exceptions to the state contemporaneous objection rule in several cases where funda-
mental rights were involved. See Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate
State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SuPaxmp COURT Rv. 187, 224.
The Supreme Court could have restricted its opinion to "settled principles" by
declaring the procedural rule inadequate on the grounds of inconsistent application.
Also, the Henry dictum stated that the Mississippi procedural rule did not serve a
legitimate state interest in this situation, because the defendant's motion for directed
verdict, partially based on the illegal admission of evidence, was an adequate sub-
stitute for an express objection. The Court appeared to be dictating procedural rules
to the state court, rules more conducive to the unfettered assertion of federal rights.
See 65 COLUM. L. Rzv. 710 (1965).
12. See Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Pro-
posals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUPREWM CoUr Rev. 187, 238.
13. 295 U.S. 441 (1935).
14. In Herndon, however, the Court held that defendant could have, in the light
of the circumstances, reasonably anticipated the reconstruction of the statute, and,
accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.
